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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
PETER K. ENNS  Despite decades of widening income inequality in the 
United States, public demand for redistribution has remained ﬂat and per-
haps even declined. This result, which Vivekinan Ashok, Ilyana Kuziemko, 
and Ebonya Washington demonstrate convincingly, stands in stark con-
trast to the expectations of standard political economy models, which pre-
dict that as inequality rises a greater proportion of the public will support 
increased redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981).1 This absence of an 
over-time relationship (or negative relationship) between inequality and 
public support for redistribution holds major implications for political 
and economic outcomes. If the public’s policy preferences are disconnected 
from changes in income inequality, then when inequality rises, policy-
makers will face no direct electoral incentive to shift taxes and spending 
in a more redistributive direction.
Further complicating the empirical puzzle, the authors show that during 
the last 30 years, the elderly (deﬁned as those 65 and above) and African 
Americans have decreased their support for redistribution the most. These 
patterns are surprising for a number of reasons. First, the authors show 
that African Americans and the elderly beneﬁt more than other groups 
from government transfers. Second, Woojin Lee and John Roemer (2006) 
demonstrate that voter racism in the United States decreases support for 
redistribution, and the magnitude of this effect could account for the differ-
ences in the size of the public sector between the United States and north-
ern European countries. Yet the authors’ ﬁnding that African American 
1. See also Kelly and Enns (2010) and Kenworthy and McCall (2008) on the lack of 
public responsiveness to rising inequality.
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support for redistribution has declined faster than white support suggests 
that racism alone cannot fully explain anti-redistributive sentiment in the 
United States. Roland Bénabou and Efe Ok (2001) offer another explana-
tion for the lack of support for redistribution, showing that the prospect of 
upward mobility (POUM) can lead an individual who is poorer than aver-
age to rationally oppose redistribution. However, because the likelihood 
of positive income mobility is low for those who are 65 and older, POUM 
is unlikely to account for the authors’ ﬁnding for the elderly.2
In addition to presenting important and surprising ﬁndings, the authors 
offer potential explanations for the patterns they observe. These explana-
tions focus on the self-interest of the elderly and declining support among 
African Americans for race-based aid. In this comment, I argue that birth-
cohort experiences offer a more compelling explanation for the shifting 
redistributive preferences of the elderly than self-interest. I also show that 
if we extend the time period of the analysis back to the 1950s, the differ-
ence in support for redistribution between whites and African Americans 
has remained relatively constant. Finally, I show that analyzing year-to-
year changes in support for redistribution (instead of focusing on the linear 
trend) offers important insights into different groups’ policy preferences.
AGE AND SELF-INTEREST OR BIRTH-COHORT EFFECTS? The authors hypothe-
size that the declining support for redistribution among the elderly reﬂects 
self-interested concerns rooted in their growing desire to protect their gov-
ernment health care beneﬁts. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors 
“ﬁnd not only a trend of decreasing support for universal care, but that this 
variable ‘explains’ about 40 percent of the elderly’s decreased support for 
redistribution.”
We must remember, however, that who constitutes “the elderly” shifts 
throughout the period of analysis. It is possible that the declining sup-
port for redistribution among the elderly reﬂects birth-cohort effects. That 
is, those born at approximately the same time may share experiences— 
particularly during their most formative years—that inﬂuence their sub-
sequent policy preferences. Consistent with this view, Paola Giuliano and 
Antonio Spilimbergo (2014) show that the macroeconomic conditions 
2. Bénabou and Ok (2001) allow that individuals may consider their offspring when 
considering the prospect of upward mobility. However, even if the elderly base their re-
distributive preferences on the prospects of their offspring’s upward mobility, to account for 
the authors’ result during the period of analysis the elderly’s conﬁdence in their offspring’s 
upward mobility prospects would have had to increase more than their offspring’s conﬁdence 
in their own upward mobility prospects.
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individuals experience between ages 18 and 25 affect their redistributive 
preferences later in life, and that this effect would produce rising con-
servatism among the elderly during most of the period of analysis. Other 
common experiences could also strengthen this effect. John Bullock 
(2012), for example, ﬁnds that precollege education reduces support for 
redistribution. This result, combined with increasing access to primary and 
secondary education during the early 1900s, would predict increasing con-
servatism among those entering the “elderly” category during the period of 
analysis. Thus, the declining support for redistribution among the elderly 
that the authors ﬁnd may actually reﬂect the fact that who constitutes 
the elderly changes each year and that during most of the period of their 
analysis those entering the elderly category were more conservative than 
previous cohorts.
To evaluate the birth-cohort hypothesis, I begin by replicating columns 1 
and 2 of the authors’ table 4 in my table 1. The dependent variable comes 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) and ranges from 1 (government 
should not concern itself with income differences) to 7 (government should 
do something to reduce income differences between the rich and poor).3
The negative coefﬁcient on the Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 interaction 
in column 1 perfectly replicates the authors’ result and indicates that on 
average, those 65 and older became less supportive of reducing income 
differences through the period of analysis. Column 2 is also a perfect rep-
lication. We see that support for government provided medical care is not 
only correlated with attitudes toward redistribution, but controlling for this 
variable accounts for much of the elderly’s declining support for redistribu-
tion (evidenced by the change in the Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 interaction 
coefﬁcient between columns 1 and 2).
Column 3 tests the birth-cohort hypothesis by controlling for year born. 
Figure 1 in Paola Giuliano’s comment shows that successive birth cohorts 
have all become increasingly conservative, with the exception of the young-
est cohort, which has become more liberal. Thus, I include Year Born and 
Year Born squared to approximate this curvilinear functional form. Con-
sistent with expectations, we see a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on 
3. The questions analyzed in my table 1 are eqwlth, helpsick, helpblk. The complete text 
of these and other GSS survey questions may be viewed in the GSS “1972–2014 Cumula-
tive Codebook” made available online by the National Opinion Research Center at http:// 
publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook.pdf. These sur vey ques-
tions appear there on pp. 245, 507, and 508, respectively. Following the authors, all variables 
have been recoded so that more support for redistribution reﬂects the higher categories.
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Year Born, suggesting declining support for redistribution among succes-
sive birth-cohorts, but a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient with Year Born 
squared, which suggests an uptick in support for redistribution among the 
youngest cohorts. Most importantly, the Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 inter- 
action is small, positive, and imprecisely estimated, suggesting that account-
ing for the year respondents were born also accounts for the previously 
observed decline in the elderly’s support for redistribution. It is important 
to note that even though Year Born and Age are correlated, because the 
data include repeated cross-sections, the two are not completely redundant. 
Column 4, which controls for Age and Age squared, illustrates this point. 
The negative and signiﬁcant Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 interaction indi-
cates that controlling for age does not account for the declining support for 
redistribution among the elderly.4
4. See the online appendix for a replication of these results with ANES data.
Table 1. Declining Support for Redistribution among Those 65 and Older  
and Evidence Consistent with the Birth-Cohort Hypothesisa
Replication of 
authors’ table 4:
Controlling for:
Year 
born 
(3)
 
Age 
(4)
Gov’t help 
blacks 
(5)
Col. 1 
(1)
Col. 2 
(2)
Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 −1.60* −0.97 0.64 −1.88* −1.08
(0.53) (0.47) (0.76) (0.53) (0.56)
Gov’t medical care 0.50*
(0.02)
Year born −1.41*
(0.26)
(Year born)2 0.0004*
(0.0001)
Age −0.04*
(0.01)
(Age)2 0.0004*
(0.0001)
Gov’t help blacks 0.36*
(0.02)
No. of observations 21,710 21,710 21,709 21,710 21,273
Source: Data from the General Social Survey Cumulative File.
a. Regressions are weighted using survey weights and include year ﬁxed effects and a dichotomous 
indicator for being 65 or older. Standard errors are clustered by year. Asterisk indicates statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the 5 percent level.
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Column 5 controls for support for government helping African Amer-
icans. If common experiences have made successive birth cohorts less 
supportive of government and redistribution, we would expect a sub-
stantial reduction in the Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 interaction term if we 
control for support for government helping African Americans. Indeed, 
the magnitude of the Elderly × (Year-1975)/100 interaction parallels the 
result in column 2, and the difference in coefﬁcients is not close to sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. When viewed in isolation, the results in column 5 
could also be consistent with the authors’ age and self-interest hypothesis 
if those 65 and older are increasingly concerned with protecting their 
health-care beneﬁts and thus less supportive of government redistribution 
and less supportive of government helping African Americans. However, 
when considered alongside the results in columns 3 and 4, the combined 
evidence lends more support to the birth-cohort hypothesis.
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND WHITE CONVERGENCE OR THE CONTINUATION OF 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS? The fact that African American support for redistri-
bution has declined faster than white support is another important and sur-
prising result. In their conclusion, the authors suggest that whites’ reaction 
to the Civil Rights Movement may help explain the surprising over-time 
patterns of support for redistribution among whites and blacks. Indeed, 
since the Civil Rights Movement, attitudes toward poverty and support for 
welfare have become strongly connected with race (Gilens 1999). Thus, 
we might expect a steep decline in support for redistribution among whites 
during and following this period. My ﬁgure 1 examines this prediction 
with two nearly identical questions from the American National Election 
Studies (ANES).
The ﬁrst question, also analyzed by the authors in their ﬁgure 3 (lower-
right panel), asked whether respondents believe the government in Wash-
ington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard 
of living (coded as 1) or whether government should just let each person 
get ahead on his or her own (coded as 7). In my ﬁgure 1, I plot the percent 
of African Americans and whites in favor of guaranteed jobs and a good 
standard of living from 1972 to 2008.5 I also include a nearly identically 
worded ANES question about government-guaranteed jobs and a good 
standard of living that offered just two response options (instead of seven). 
This question was asked in 1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 2002 and 
5. The percentages that appear in my ﬁgure 1 differ slightly from the series reported by 
the authors in their ﬁgure 3 (lower-right panel), because they report the mean response for 
whites and African Americans (not percentages).
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thus allows an analysis of support for redistribution among whites and 
African Americans before and after the Civil Rights Movement.6
Several patterns stand out in my ﬁgure 1. First, unsurprisingly, through-
out the entire period of analysis African Americans are more support-
ive than whites of government ensuring that every person has a job and a 
good standard of living. Second, between 1960 and 1964, white support for 
20
40
60
80
1960 1970 1980
Year
1990 2000
Blacks, VCF0809
Blacks, VCF0808
Whites, VCF0809
Whites, VCF0808
Whites, linear fita
Blacks, linear fita
Percent
Source: Based on the variables VCF0809 and VFC0808, and survey weights from the ANES Cumulative Data 
File. See text.
a. Linear trend lines based on VCF0808.
Figure 1. Percent Favoring Guaranteed Jobs and a Good Living Standard,  
by Race, 1956–2008
6. In 1956, 1958, and 1960, four response options were given, and these were recoded 
into two categories. The question wording differed slightly during the ﬁrst three years, but 
all respondents received the same wording in any given year. Thus, the drop in white support 
relative to African American support—which is the key ﬁnding of interest—cannot be attrib-
uted to the shift in question wording. The complete text of these and other survey questions 
in the ANES may be viewed in the “1948–2012 Time Series Cumulative Data File,” available 
at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes._timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm
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guaranteed jobs drops almost in half to just 35 percent. The magnitude of 
this decline is stunning and is consistent with a strong reaction to the 
Civil Rights Movement and legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. In contrast to the steep drop among whites, the decline among 
African Americans has followed a linear trend since the 1950s. Interest-
ingly, if white support for guaranteed jobs and a good standard of living 
had declined at a linear rate and in parallel with African American support 
(see the gray trend lines), white support would have ended up about where 
it did in 2008 (the ﬁnal year of the authors’ analysis). Thus, although sup-
port for redistribution has declined more among African Americans than 
whites since the 1970s, by extending the time series back to the 1950s 
we see relatively similar long-term trajectories.
YEAR-TO-YEAR OPINION CHANGE The authors focus primarily on the lin-
ear trend in redistributive preferences. Given the near-linear increase in 
the pretax income share of the top 1 percent since the 1970s (with some 
zig-zags around the trend line in the late-1990s and 2000s), this focus on 
preference trends makes sense. However, short-term shifts in policy prefer-
ences can also be informative. To explore these changes, my ﬁgures 2 and 3 
plot support for reducing income differences and support for spending 
more on welfare by age, race, income level, and partisanship. As with any 
subgroup analysis, we must remember that sampling error is larger because 
we are not analyzing all respondents, but these ﬁgures offer a general pic-
ture of how various groups’ preferences have shifted from year to year.
The upper panels of my ﬁgure 2 provide the same information as the 
authors’ ﬁgure 3 (upper-right and lower-left panels). However, instead of 
plotting the mean response each year by group, I plot the percentage of 
each group in favor of reducing income differences. Additionally, instead 
of indicating a point for each year and plotting the linear trend line, I 
connect the points, which helps illustrate the year-to-year changes in each 
group’s reported preferences. I also report the preferences of the highest 
and lowest income quartiles (lower-left panel) and of Democrats and 
Republicans (lower-right).7 Plotting the data in this way highlights several 
important patterns.
7. In order to approximate income quartiles, I used the realinc variable, which reports 
family income in constant dollars. Because incomes are grouped, the actual proportion 
of the upper-income group varied from 15 to 27 percent of respondents, with a mean of 
19 percent. The actual proportion of the low-income group ranged from 20 to 26 percent of 
respondents, with a mean of 22 percent. The seven-point partyid variable was used to 
identify Democrats and Republicans. Independents “near” the Democratic or Republican 
party were excluded.
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For example, although those in the 65 and older group have become 
more conservative than those younger than 65, throughout the entire period 
of analysis the difference in support for reducing income differences among 
these two age groups is the smallest out of all the groups considered. Also 
of note, between 2008 and 2014, support for reducing income differences 
increased among the elderly. This pattern seems to run counter to the self- 
interest hypothesis. If declining support for redistribution among the elderly 
results because of concerns about expanding health care access, we would 
not expect the elderly to increase their support for redistribution in the 
years before and after the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.
Considering the rise of income inequality during this period, the most 
notable feature of the income group analysis (lower-left panel) is the rela-
tively ﬂat trajectories of support for reducing income differences. Perhaps 
Source: Based on the variable EQWLTH and survey weights from the GSS Cumulative Codebook. See text.
Lowest income quartile
Upper income quartile
Democrats
Republicans
Blacks
Whites65 and older
Younger than 65
20
40
60
1980 1990 2000 2010
Percent
20
40
60
1980 1990 2000 2010
Percent
Year Year
By age By race
20
40
60
1980 1990 2000 2010
Percent
20
40
60
1980 1990 2000 2010
Percent
Year Year
By income By partisanship
Figure 2. Percent Supporting Reducing Income Differences, by Group, 1978–2014
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these patterns reﬂect the fact that most of the income gains have occurred 
for the top 1 percent and above. Thus, focusing on income quartiles may 
be too coarse. By contrast, it may be that factors other than economic self-
interest inﬂuence changes in redistributive preferences. Perhaps consistent 
with this view, the increasing separation of Democrats and Republicans 
in the lower-right panel suggests that partisan identiﬁcation has become 
increasingly important for redistributive preferences.8
Source: Based on the variable NATFARE and survey weights from the GSS Cumulative Codebook. See text.
Lowest income quartile
Upper income quartile
Democrats
Republicans
Blacks
Whites
65 and older
Younger than 65
Percent Percent
Year Year
By age By race
Percent Percent
Year Year
By income By partisanship
20
40
1975 1985 1995 2005
20
40
1975 1985 1995 2005
20
40
1975 1985 1995 2005
20
40
1975 1985 1995 2005
Figure 3. Percent Supporting More Spending on Welfare, by Group, 1973–2014
8. Of course, who identiﬁes as a Democrat or Republican is not ﬁxed, so some of this 
pattern may reﬂect shifting partisan identities. For the most part, however, partisanship is 
relatively stable, and these differences likely reﬂect increased partisan sorting (Levendusky 
2009) in the electorate.
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My ﬁgure 3 plots the percentage of respondents who believe the gov-
ernment is spending too little money on welfare. Thus, higher values 
indicate support for more welfare spending. This question allows us to 
extend the time series back to 1973 and allows us to consider attitudes 
toward a speciﬁc policy action (government spending) that relates to 
redistribution. As with my ﬁgure 2, those 65 and older and those younger 
than 65 express the most similar levels of support. We also see declining 
support for more spending on welfare among African Americans. Support 
for welfare spending moves in similar ways for the highest and lowest 
income groups. While this is not a new ﬁnding (Kelly and Enns 2010; 
Page and Shapiro 1992; Wlezien and Soroka 2011), the over-time simi-
larities again raise the question of whether changing preferences reﬂect 
other considerations beyond economic self-interest or whether we would 
need to move to the extremes of the income distribution to observe dis-
tinct patterns. We also see similar trajectories among Democrats and 
Republicans, although the gap between the two groups has increased in 
recent years. The year-to-year analysis of welfare spending preferences 
also shows that support for welfare spending declined among all groups 
in the early 1990s. This is an important pattern, because in 1996 the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act radically 
altered welfare policy. It appears that this policy shift was consistent with 
shifting public preferences.
CONCLUSION When the public’s policy preferences change, policy tends 
to follow (Enns forthcoming; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page 
and Shapiro 1983; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Thus, understanding how 
and why the public’s preferences shift holds important implications. Ashok, 
Kuziemko, and Washington present a novel and sophisticated analysis 
that pushes us toward a better understanding of the over-time dynamics 
of public support for redistribution and how this varies (or does not vary) 
across key subgroups. The primary focus is the United States, but their 
use of cross-national public opinion data is equally important.
They show, for example, that the decline in support for redistribu-
tion among the elderly—relative to those less than 65 years old—has not 
occurred in Germany, Sweden, or the United Kingdom. In the United 
Kingdom, support for reducing income differences has declined among 
both the elderly and the nonelderly. Both groups have also decreased 
support for redistribution in Germany, but this decrease has been most 
pronounced among those under age 65. In Sweden, by contrast, both 
groups have increased agreement with reducing income differences in 
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society, but those 61 and older have shown a greater increase in these 
redistributive preferences.9 Given the evidence above, future research 
should investigate whether macroeconomic conditions experienced by 
birth cohorts help explain these cross-national differences.
Another task for future research is to further understand why different 
age groups and racial groups adjust their support for redistribution as they 
do. In this comment I have suggested that birth-cohort effects may offer 
a more complete account of the changes in the elderly’s attitudes toward 
redistribution than self-interest rooted in the desire to protect government 
health-care beneﬁts. I have also suggested that the decline in African 
American support for redistribution may reﬂect the continuation of a long-
term trend that actually parallels the long-term trajectory among whites. 
Considering the fact that the income share of the richest 1 percent (and 
above) has continued to increase for more than three decades, as well 
as the fact that changes in various groups’ demand for redistribution do 
not appear to correspond with the predictions of standard political econ-
omy models, understanding what has led to these changes in support for 
redistribution is a crucial undertaking for future research.
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COMMENT BY
PAOLA GIULIANO   The question this paper by Vivekinan Ashok, 
Ilyana Kuziemko, and Ebonya Washington tackles is an important one: 
What determines support for redistribution in the United States? The 
authors use the General Social Survey and the American National Election 
Studies for the period between 1972 and 2006, assembling the longest 
possible time series of questions regarding preferences for redistribution. 
They also complement their analysis with data from the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Sweden.
Their paper emphasizes the importance of exogenous traits, including 
age, gender, and race. Whereas there are no systematic differences in pref-
erences for redistribution over time by gender, the authors uncover a sharp 
decline in preferences for redistribution among the elderly (people older 
than 65) and African Americans. The decline among the elderly almost 
disappears with the inclusion of other covariates (in particular, education), 
whereas the decline among African Americans does not appear to be driven 
by other confounding factors.
According to the authors, the elderly are against redistribution because 
they believe it will come at their own expense, in particular through cuts 
